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NOTES
THE LIABILITY OF A SPORTS EXHIBITOR TO
FOR INJURIES

ARISING

OUT

His

PATRONS

OF THE SPORT

The liability of a proprietor exhibiting a sports event depends not
only upon the jurisdiction in which the injury occurs, but also upon the
particular form of contest the participants are engaged in. Injuries growing out of the sport itself result in liability from rules peculiar to that type
of injury. Although at times these same rules are applicable to other types
of injuries incurred at these performances, that phase of the problem will
not be considered in this paper. We are here primarly concerned only
with injuries resulting from batted baseballs, flying pucks at hockey games,
golf balls which leave the course, and other similar occurrences.
[191]

WYOMING LAW JOURNAL

The spectator, having paid an admission price, is a business invitee,'
and the proprietor is bound to exercise reasonable care for the invitee's
protection. 2 This is not to say, however, that the proprietor is an insurer
for the invitee's safety.8 Rather, before liability can be imposed on the
exhibitor it must be shown that he was negligent. Conversely, the defendant can avoid liability by showing freedom from negligence. Thus,
the proprietor's primary defense is showing that he has fulfilled his duty.
The duty required of the defendant in this respect has become rather
well established. Even though the danger may be apparent, as in the case
of batted baseballs, the proprietor needs to do more than just sit back and
let the spectator look out for himself. A certain portion of the seats must
be protected by screening before it can be said the exhibitor has performed
his duty. Some courts set up as a standard screening sufficient to provide
seats of this type for such a number of spectators as may reasonably be
expected to call for them. 4 Other courts merely point out that the defendant need only conform to common practice.5 This is to say he is not
being negligent if he has provided as much screening as do other similar
ballparks. It is evident that if the proprietor provides the amount of
screening required in the jurisdiction, he has fulfilled his duty, unless
something more is required of him.
The defendant's second mode of defense is that of contributory negligence. This does not differ from contributory negligence as applied in
other tort cases. It is simply a matter of the jury finding mutual negligences
in which case the defendant is excused. 6 This varies with the facts of each
partciular case, what the defendant did or failed to do constituting negligence, and the plaintiff's action in relation to the injury. No particular
generalization regarding sports events themselves can nor need be made.
The third and only remaining form of defense available to the proprietor is that of assumption of risk on the part of the plaintiff. Speaking
generally, and not having regard to any particular type of situation, assumption of risk means that plaintiff, who knows or should know of the dangerous circumstances, has consented to relieve the defendant of his duty by
voluntarily placing himself in a position where injury can result from the
dangerous condition, and agreeing usually by implication that he will look
out for the dangers himself. Having reference to plaintiff's state of mind
7
and his knowledge, the defendant is relieved of his legal duty of conduct.
1.
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Restatement, Torts sec. 332 at 897 (1934).
Id. sec. 343 at 942; Prosser, Torts sec. 79 at 642 (1941).
Prosser, Torts sec. 79 at 635 (1941); Hall, Voluntary Assumption of Risk-Contributory Negligence-Injuries to Patrons at Places of Amusement, 10 So. Cal. L. Rev.
70 (1937).
Quinn v. Recreation Park Ass'n., 3 Cal.2d 725, 46 P.2d 144 (1935).
Hudson v. Kansas City Baseball Club, Inc., 349 Mo. 1215, 164 S.W.2d 318 (1942);
Ratcliff v. San Diego Baseball Club of the Pacific Coast League, 27 Cal.2d 733, 81
P.2d 625 (1938).
Prosser, Torts sec. 52 at 393 (1941)..
Id. sec. 51 (1941); Restatement, Torts sec. 893 (1934).

NOTEs

The adopted rule in baseball cases is that where one chooses an unprotected seat, he assumes the risk of being injured by a ball batted either
during practice or during the main event.8 This rule, as practical as it is
in baseball cases, becomes a minority rule in other sports injury cases. The
reason for the distinction is that it is of common knowledge that baseballs
are batted into the grandstand, 9 while this is not true, for example, of pucks
in hockey games. 10 But even in this latter type of case the recovery is
limited to those cases where the spectator is attending for the first time.
After witnessing one event where the dangers are not of common knowledge, the spectator cannot rely on the rule because he may then be charged
with actual knowledge. And as for that matter, a plaintiff might be barred
by actual knowledge even at the first game if the danger becomes apparent
to him, or should have become apparent to him as a prudent person."
Whether or not the spectator actually appreciated the dangers involved is a question of fact usually left for a jury to decide.' 2 However,
a rather radical view of this question was taken in the case of Ingersoll v.
Onoganda Hockey Club.1 a There the plaintiff was attending her first
hockey game and was injured the first time the puck left the ice. In spite of
these extreme circumstances, the plaintiff was nonsuited in the court below
and the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court in affirming
held that plaintiff assumed the risk as a matter of law. Though this case
is cited approvingly by some courts, they actually only adopt the rule of
assumption of risk to the extent that the plaintiff had actual knowledge
of the risk, or that it is a matter of common knowledge.1 4 In Thurman v.
Ice Palace'5 the facts were identical to those in the Ingersoll case and the
trial court applied the strict rule of the latter case by directing a verdict.
This was reversed on appeal, the court specifically stating that it was not
a matter of common knowledge that hockey pucks left the ice, and that
this is a matter for the jury.
Although courts in these cases speak of assumption of risk, there may
actually be some confusion of that doctrine with contributory negligence.
To better appreciate this fact a distinction of the two doctrines is necessary.
Where there has been an assumption of risk the defendant is relieved of a
8.
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Hudson v. Kansas City Baseball Club, supra; Ratcliff v. San Diego Baseball Club,
supra; Blackball v. Capitol District Baseball Ass'n., 154 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 640, 278

N.Y. Supp. 649 (1935); Brisson v. Minneapolis Baseball ge Athletic Ass'n., 185
Minn. 507, 240 N.W. 903 (1932); Lorino v. New Orleans Baseball & Amusement
Co., 16 La. 95, 133 So. 408 (1931).

Quinn v. Recreation Park Ass'n., supra; Thuber v. Skouras Theatres Corporation,
112 N.J.L. 385, 170 A. 863 (1934); Blakeley v. White Star Line, 154 Mich. 635, 118
N.W. 482 (1908).
Tite v. Omaha Coliseum Corporation, 144 Neb. 22, 12 N.W.2d 90 (1943); Thruman
v. Ice Palace, 36 Cal. 364, 97 P.2d 999 (1939), rehearing denied, 125 P.2d 59 (1942).
Tite v. Omaha Coliseum Corporation, supra.
Thurman v. Ice Palace, supra; Cincinnati Baseball Club Co. v. Eno, 112 Ohio 175,
147 N.E. 86 (1925).
245 App.D iv. 137, 281 N.Y. Supp. 505 (1935).
Hunt v. Thomasville Baseball Co., 80 Ga. 572, 56 S.E.2d 828 (1949); Shurman v.
Fresno Ice Rink, 91 Cal.2d 469, 205 P.2d 77 (1949).
36 Cal. 364, 97 P.2d 999 (1939).
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duty to protect the plaintiff. Hence, there can be no breach of duty which
will place liability on the defendant.1 6 In contributory negligence the
17
duty is admitted ,but the liability is avoided by plaintiff's conduct.
Assumption of risk is necessarily free and voluntary,' 8 though the
plaintiff need not be aware of the specific risk he is assuming. 19 Thus,
if the doctrine is applied where the plaintiff is not aware of at least the
geenral circumstances, he will be held to have assumed the risk involuntarily. This does not meet with the recognized requirements nor is it sound
logic. Since courts are generally willing to place some affirmative duty
on the defendant, it would seem that contributory negligence is the more
applicable doctrine. Then it could be said that plaintiff was contributorily
negligent by placing himself in a position which would make injury to him
possible. 20 However, some courts specifically say that this does ntot con21
stitute contributory negligence.
A majority of the courts hold that assumption of risk is applicable to
these cases, 22 while some say that it should be restricted to the contractual

relationship of master and servant. 28 As the Ingersoll case shows some courts
apply it to sports cases and enlarge it by saying in effect that the plaintiff
is presumed to have knowledge of the risks involved, though in fact he
does not. It is apparent that this class of cases departs drastically from
those holding that assumption of risk is voluntary, and whether or not it
has in fact been assumed is a question of fact for the jury. 24 This doctrine
has not yet received widespread recognition outside of baseball cases,
though some courts indicate by dictum that they might adhere to it.28
Though the discussion has been centered chiefly around baseball and
hockey, the same rules are applicable in other sporting events. Golf spectators, for example, are in the same position. Here, it has been held that the
proprietor does not owe a duty to the spectators in regard to "sliced"
balls. 26 The majority rule, however, appears to be that the golf spectator

can only be charged with assumption of risk where he can be found to

27
have actual knowledge of the dangers from sliced balls.
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James, Assumption of Risk, 61 Yale L. J. 141 (1952); Thomas, Liability of Exhibitors
to Spectators at Public Exhibitions: Assumption of Risk, 24 Cal. L. Rev. 431 (1936).
Prosser, Torts sec. 51 at 378 (1941); Thomas, supra note 16.
Prosser, Torts sec. 51 at 388 (1941).
Id. at 387.
Hall, supra note 3, at 69.
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Platt v. Erie County Agricultural Society, 164 App. Div. 99, 149 N.Y. Supp. 520
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(1914); Arnold v. State of New York, 163 App. Div. 253, 148 N.Y. Supp. 479 (1914);
Barrett v. Lake Ontario Beach Imp. Co., 174 N.Y. 310, 66 N.E. 986 .(1903).
Potts v. Crafts, 5 Cal.2d 83, 85, 42 P.2d 87, 88 (1935).
Bouchard & Sons Co. v. Keaton, 9 Tenn. 467, 481 (1928).
Morris v. Cleveland Hockey Club, 157 Ohio 225, 98 N.E.2d 49 (1951); 105 N.E.2d
419 (1952); Thurman v. Ice Palace, supra.
Falk v. Stanley Fabian Corporation of Delaware, 115 N.J.L. 141, 178 A. 740 (1935);
Thurber v. Skouras Theatres Corporation, supra; Pointer v. Mountain Ry. Const.
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Co., 269 Mo. 104, 189 S.W. 805 (1916).
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Benjamin v. Nernberg, 102 Pa. Super. 471, 157 A. 10 (1931).

Alexander v. Wrenn, 158 Va. 486, 164 S.E. 715 (1932).

NoTEs
This apparent freedom from liability is subject to some criticism. At
every sports event, regardless of kind or where staged, a small percentage
of the spectators are witnessing such an event for the first time. This
happens either because parents are taking a child to the event for the first
time or because an adult has never before had an opportunity to attend.
This is especially true of such localized events as rodoes which attract some
tourists at almost every performance who have never beforc seen one. Although presently there do not appear to be any cases holding that the
possibility of a rampaging Brahma bull at a rodeo is a matter of common
knowledge, this result could be reached if reference is made only to a restricted geographical locale. At least it is safe to assume that a large
part of the people in the West, and especially regular rodeo attenders,
recognize such an event as a possibility.
A second criticism is that in each instance the proprietor is in the best
position to know of the incident dangers. It would seem that he should be
liable if he permits his patrons to get into a place where injury is possible.
It is only natural for a spectator to want to have the seat nearest the performance so that he can see as much as possible. In taking such a seat
the patron has a right to assume the place is safe, and in making this
ssumption, he is relying on the knowledge of the proprietor. A spectator
at a wrestling match would be very apt to choose a ringside seat if it was
available and he could pay the price. Yet, if this was his first ittendance,
he might not know that at times one of the contestants is thrown out into
the audience. As a matter of fact, such an incident might not take place
even after this spectator has attended several matches. But merely because
up to this time he has seen the participants pick each other up, and has
seen them dropped to the floor, he is on notice that one might throw the
other into the audience. To charge the patron with knowledge under
these circumstances does not appear equitable especially since a simple
warning of the proprietor would give the patron actual notice, and operate
28
as well to preclude recovery.
Of course it would put an undue burden on the exhibitor to ask each
person whether he knows of the dangers, or if he is attending for the first
time. But it would not be asking too much to have the proprietor put up
a few clearly visible signs in conspicuous places to warn of the dangers. In
at least one hockey case the court has placed such a duty upon the defendant.29 Naturally, under the law as it presently exists, the proprietor
is under no compulsion to do anything of this kind since in a majority of
the instances he will avoid liability.
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Prosser, Torts sec. 79 at 642 (1941).
Shanney v. Boston Madison Square Garden Corp., 296 Mass. 168, 5 N.E.2d 1 (1936).

